We consider the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM) in which a user wishes to compute the product of two matrices with the assistance of honest but curious servers. We construct polynomial codes for SDMM by studying a combinatorial problem on a special type of addition table, which we call the degree table. The codes are based on arithmetic progressions, and are thus named GASP (Gap Additive Secure Polynomial) Codes. GASP Codes are shown to outperform all previously known polynomial codes for secure distributed matrix multiplication in terms of download rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM), in which a user has two matrices A and B and wishes to compute their product AB with the assistance of N servers, without leaking any information about A or B to any server. We assume that all servers are honest and responsive, but that they are curious, in that any T of them may collude to try to deduce information about either A or B.
When considering the problem of SDMM from an information-theoretic perspective, the primary performance metric used in the literature is that of the download rate, or simply rate, which we denote by R. The rate R is defined to be the ratio of the amount of information about AB (in bits) the user downloads from the servers to the total number of downloaded bits. The goal is to construct a SDMM scheme with rate R as large as possible, given a limit on the number of servers or on their computational power.
The problem of constructing polynomial codes for SDMM can be summarized as follows. We partition the matrices A and B as follows:
making sure that all products A k B are well-defined and of the same size. Computing the product AB is equivalent to Authors listed in alphabetical order of last name. The first two authors were partially supported by the NSF under Grant CNS-1801630. computing all subproducts A k B . One then constructs a polynomial h(x) whose coefficients encode the submatrices A k B , and has N servers compute evaluations h(a 1 ), . . . , h(a N ). The polynomial h is constructed so that every T -subset of evaluations reveals no information about A or B, but so that the user can reconstruct all of AB given all N evaluations.
The parameters K and L are inversely proportional to the amount of computation that each of the servers will have to perform. Mathematically, it is convenient to think of the number of servers, N , as a function of K and L.
A. Related Work
We distinguish the SDMM problem from the case where only one of the matrices must be kept secure. In this case, one can use methods like Shamir's secret sharing [3] or Staircase codes [4] , if one is also interested in straggler mitigation.
Let A and B be partitioned as in (1) , and consider the problem of SDMM with N servers and T -security. In [1] , a distributed matrix multiplication scheme is presented for the case K = L which achieves a download rate of
In [2] , this is improved to
where the polynomial code uses N = (K + T )(L + 1) − 1 servers. Given some fixed N and T , the authors of [2] then find a near-optimal solution to the problem of finding K and L such that (K + T )(L + 1) − 1 ≤ N and such that the rate R 2 , as above, is maximized. In [5] , the authors study the case for T = 1 and obtain a download rate of R = KL/(KL + K + L), which is the rate of [2] in this case. In [6] , the authors consider the SDMM problem with stragglers.
For distributed computations, polynomial codes were originally introduced in [7] in a slightly different setting, namely to mitigate stragglers in distributed matrix multiplication. This work was followed up by [8] which studied fundamental limits of this problem, introduced a generalization of polynomial codes known as entangled polynomial codes, and applied similar ideas to other problems in distributed computing.
In [9] , the authors develop MatDot and PolyDot codes for distributed matrix multiplication with stragglers, and show Fig. 1 : Comparison of the Polynomial Code GASP, presented in this work, with that of [1] and [2] . We plot the rate of the schemes for K = 20 and L = 20 on the left, and K = 10 and L = 20 on the right. The scheme in [1] is designed for K = L.
that while the communication cost is higher than that of the polynomial codes of [7] , the recovery threshold, defined to be the minimum number of workers which need to respond to guarantee successful decoding, is much smaller than that of [7] . The MatDot codes of [9] were then applied to the problem of nearest neighbor estimation in [10] . More fundamental questions about the trade-off in computation cost and communication cost in distributed computing were previously addressed in [11] .
B. Main Contribution
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
• In Section II we introduce our polynomial code GASP via an explicit example, in order to demonstrate all of the subtleties of the scheme construction. In Section III we formalize the notion of Polynomial Code and introduce some basic definitions. • In Section IV we introduce the key notion of this paper, the degree table of a polynomial code. We show, in Theorem 1, that to every degree table corresponds a secure distributed matrix multiplication scheme. • In Section V, we present a secure distributed matrix multiplication scheme, GASP. We show that GASP outperforms, for most parameters, all previously known schemes in the literature, in terms of the download rate. The rate of GASP, for L ≤ K, is given in Table I . For K < L, the rate is given by interchanging K and L.
II. A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE: K = L = 3 AND T = 2
We begin our scheme description with the following example, which we present in as much detail as possible to showcase the essential ingredients of the scheme. In this example we consider the multiplication of two matrices A and B over a finite field F q , partitioned as:
Download Rate
Regions so that all products A k B are well-defined and of the same size. The product AB is given by
We construct a scheme which computes each term A k B , and therefore all of AB, via polynomial interpolation. The scheme is private against any T = 2 servers colluding to deduce the identities of A and B, and uses a total of N = 18 servers. Let R 1 and R 2 be two matrices picked uniformly at random with entries in F q , both of size equal to the A k . Similarly, pick S 1 and S 2 uniformly at random of size equal to that of the B . Define polynomials
where the α k and β are natural numbers that will be determined shortly.
As in [1] , we will recover the products A k B by interpolating the product h(x) = f (x)g(x). Specifically, for some evaluation points a n ∈ F q , we will send f (a n ) and g(a n ) to server n = 1, . . . , N , who then respond with h(a n ) = f (a n )g(a n ). These evaluations will suffice to interpolate all of h(x). In particular, we will be able to retrieve the coefficients of h(x), which in turn will allow us to decode all the A k B .
The product h(x) = f (x)g(x) is given by
We wish to assign the exponents α k and β to guarantee decodability. Consider the following condition on the exponents:
That is, all of the exponents corresponding to the terms we wish to decode must be distinct from all the other exponents appearing in h(x). This guarantees that each product A k B appears as the unique coefficient of a unique power of x. The immediate goal is to minimize the number of distinct powers of x appearing in h(x), subject to the above condition. This will allow us to minimize the number of servers used by the scheme, thereby maximizing the rate.
The problem of assigning the α k and β can alternately be phrased as the following combinatorial problem. Consider the following addition table:
We call this table the degree table since it encodes the degrees that appear in h(x) = f (x)g(x). With this in mind, we wish to pick α k , β ∈ N such that every term in the upper-left 3 × 3 block is distinct from every other number in the table.
Outside this block, we wish to minimize the number of distinct integers that appear, in order to minimize the number of nonzero coefficients of h(x) and therefore the number of required evaluation points. Consider the assignment α 1 = 0, α 2 = 1, α 3 = 2, α 4 = 9, α 5 = 12
and β 1 = 0, β 2 = 3, β 3 = 6, β 4 = 9, β 5 = 10, for which the degree table is given by which satisfies our decodability condition. Concretely, the polynomial h(x) is now of the form
which has N = 18 potentially non-zero coefficients. Here each C j is a sum of products of matrices where each summand has either R k or S as a factor, and thus their precise nature is not important for decoding. We now show that over a suitable field F q , we can find N = 18 evaluation points a n which suffice to interpolate h(x). Let J be the set of exponents which occur in the above expression for h(x), that is, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22} so that |J | = 18. We wish to find an evaluation vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ F N q such that the 18 × 18 generalized Vandermonde matrix GV (a, J ) = a j n , 1 ≤ n ≤ 18, j ∈ J is invertible. One can easily check that for q = 29, the assignment a n = n (mod 29) for n = 1, . . . , 18 results in det(GV (a, J )) = 20 = 0 (mod 29). Thus the coefficients of h(x), in particular the A k B , are uniquely decodable in the current scheme.
It is perhaps not obvious that the scheme we have described satisfies the 2-privacy condition. Let us show that this is indeed the case. As in [1] , the 2-privacy condition will be satisfied provided that the matrices P n,m = a 9 n a 12 n a 9 m a 12 m , Q n,m = a 9 n a 10 n a 9 m a 10 m are invertible for any pair 1 ≤ n = m ≤ 18. We compute det(Q n,m ) = a 9 n a 9 m (a m − a n ) and det(P n,m ) = a 9 n a 9 m (a 3 m − a 3 n ). Thus, provided that a 3 n = a 3 m for all n = m, and that none of the a n are zero, these matrices will all be invertible. However, since gcd(3, q − 1) = 1, the map x → x 3 is a bijection from F 29 to itself. Thus a n = a m implies that a 3 n = a 3 m for all n = m, and, therefore, the determinants of the above matrices are all non-zero. Hence, the 2-privacy condition is satisfied.
In the case for K = L = 3 and T = 2, the schemes in [1] and [2] achieve the rates R 1 = 9/25 and R 2 = 9/19, whereas the scheme we have presented above improves on these constructions to achieve a rate of R = 9/18. While this improvement may seem marginal, we will later see that, for large parameters, we achieve significant gains over the polynomial codes of [1] and [2] . L+T   TABLE II: The Degree Table: For decodability, the numbers in the red block must be distinct to all the other ones. For T -security, all numbers in the green/blue block must be pairwise distinct.
III. SECURE POLYNOMIAL CODES
Let A and B be matrices over a finite field F q , partitioned as in equation (1) so that all products A k B are well-defined and of the same size. Then AB is the block matrix
A polynomial code is a tool for computing the product AB in a distributed manner, by computing each block A k B . Formally, we define a polynomial code as follows. A polynomial code PC(K, L, T, N, α, β) is used to securely compute the product AB as follows. A user chooses T matrices R t over F q of the same size as the A k independently and uniformly at random, and T matrices S t of the same size as the B independently and uniformly at random. They define polynomials f (x) and g(x) by
Given N servers, the user chooses evaluation points a 1 , . . . , a N ∈ F q r for some finite extension F q r of F q . They then send f (a n ) and g(a n ) to server n = 1, . . . , N , who computes the product f (a n )g(a n ) = h(a n ) and transmits it back to the user. The user then interpolates the polynomial h(x) given all of the evaluations h(a n ), and attempts to recover all products A k B from the coefficients of h(x). We omit the evaluation vector a from the notation PC(K, L, T, N, α, β) because as we will shortly show, it does not really affect any important analysis of the polynomial code.
Definition 2.
A polynomial code PC(K, L, T, N, α, β) is decodable and T -secure if there exists an evaluation vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ F N q r for some r > 0 such that for any A and B as above, the following two conditions hold.
(i) (Decodability) All products A k B for k = 1, . . . , K and = 1, . . . , L are completely determined by the evaluations h(a n ) for n = 1, . . . , N . where I(·; ·) denotes mutual information between two random variables. Definition 3. Suppose that the polynomial code PC(K, L, T, N, α, β) is decodable and T -secure. The download rate, or simply the rate, of this polynomial code is defined to be R = KL N .
Given parameters K, L, and T , the goal of polynomial coding is to construct a decodable and T -secure polynomial code PC(K, L, T, α, β) with download rate as large as possible. This is equivalent to minimizing the number of servers N , or equivalently, the number of evaluation points needed by the code.
IV. THE DEGREE TABLE
In this section we relate the construction of polynomial codes for SDMM to a certain combinatorial problem. Constructing α and β so that α ⊕ β is decodable and Tsecure can be realized as the following combinatorial problem, displayed in Table II . The condition of decodability from Definition 5 simply states that each α k + β in the red block must be distinct from every other entry in α⊕β. The condition of T -security states that all α K+t in the green block must be pairwise distinct, and all β L+t in the blue block must be pairwise distinct. We refer to this table as the degree table.
Definition 6. Let A be a matrix with entries in N. We define the terms of A to be the set
The terms in the outer sum α⊕β correspond to the terms in the polynomial h(x) = f (x)g(x). Because of this, we refer to the table representation of α⊕β in Table II as the degree table of the polynomial code PC(K, L, T, N, α, β). The following theorem allows us to reduce the construction of polynomial codes to the construction of degree tables which are decodable and T -secure. Thanks to Theorem 1, constructing a polynomial code scheme for secure distributed matrix multiplication can be done by constructing α and β such that the degree table, α⊕β, is decodable and T -secure. For this reason, the visualization in Table II is extremely useful, both as a guide for constructing polynomial codes for SDMM and as a method for calculating the corresponding download rate. In this context, maximizing the download rate is equivalent to minimizing | terms(α⊕β)|, the number of distinct integers in the degree table shown in Table II , subject to decodability and T -security.
V. GAP ADDITIVE SECURE POLYNOMIAL CODES
In this section, we construct a polynomial code, GASP, which has better rate than all previous schemes in the literature. The scheme construction chooses α and β to attempt to minimize the number of distinct integers in the degree table, α ⊕ β. The scheme construction proceeds by choosing α k and β to belong to certain arithmetic progressions. Definition 7. Given K, L, and T , define the polynomial code GASP as follows. Let α and β be given by
if L ≤ K. If L > K, then interchange α and β.
Lastly, define N = | terms(α ⊕ β)|. Then GASP is defined to be the polynomial code PC(K, L, T, N, α, β).
Showing that GASP is decodable and T -secure is just a matter of checking that the α and β in Definition 7 satisfy the conditions in Definition 5.
Theorem 2. The polynomial code GASP is decodable and T -secure.
Finding the number of terms, and consequently the rate, of GASP is done by breaking the degree table into regions, counting the number of terms in those regions and then applying the inclusion-exclusion principle. Theorem 3. Let N = | terms(α ⊕ β)|, where α and β are as in Definition 7. Then N is given by
Consequently, the polynomial code GASP has download rate R = KL/N , as shown in Table I. 
